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Abstract: The recent economic crisis has led to calls for a comprehensive
restructuring of energy, financial, health care, and educational systems. Critics
worry the restructuring of these complex institutional arrangements could produce
adverse unintended consequences. Given these concerns, pre-testing of proposed
changes is eminently desirable but also exceedingly difficult. This essay focuses on
the potential use of agent-based modeling for studying proposed changes in
institutional arrangements in advance of actual implementation. Ongoing
agent-based research on the restructuring of electric power markets is used for
concrete illustration.
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1 Introduction
The standard approach to economic modeling entails the analytical specification
of parameterized systems of equations. Using this approach, it is extraordinarily
difficult to capture physical, institutional, and behavioral aspects of economies with
empirical fidelity and still retain analytical tractability.
All of us have no doubt sat through many painful seminars in which economists
have presented analytical models purporting to represent reality that would strike a
typical person (and perhaps a good portion of the profession) as empirical nonsense.
Yet our wont in the past has been to accept this as necessary because, after all, what
else can be done. Equations must be solvable.
When the issue at hand is the explanation of an empirical regularity, the lack of
micro-validated underpinnings can perhaps be glossed over by focusing audience at-
tention on the matching of model outcomes to selected empirical data. For example,
within mainstream macroeconomics today it is common to see researchers resorting
to ad-hoc shocks, ad-hoc parameter calibrations, and/or incredible prior restrictions
to ensure posterior model outcomes bend to the data.
On the other hand, when the focus of a study is an institution, a retreat to these
time-honored tactics simply will not wash. The institution must be explicitly mod-
eled. It is the centerpiece of the study from which eyes cannot be averted.
1 Invited short essay for a special issue of the Eastern Economic Journal on agent-based modeling.
2What is to be done, then, when the issue of interest is institutional design and per-
formance? Look out upon any actual socio-economic landscape. What is observed
are not parameterized systems of equations but rather collections of autonomous
people interacting through historical time. The interactions of these people are chan-
neled and constrained by physical and institutional arrangements. In turn, these ar-
rangements are affected at various time scales by the interactions of the people.
This is the social reality we all experience. Cannot we model social reality the
way we actually experience it? For institutional studies, in particular, are we not
bound as social scientists to model social reality the way we actually experience it?
In this essay I argue, in the affirmative, that economists and other social scientists
can model social reality the way we experience it, as collections of autonomous
people interacting through historical time. Specifically, I argue that Agent-Based
Modeling (ABM) permits this to be done with empirical fidelity and logical rigor.
Section 2 provides a brief summary of the ABM methodology as it specifically
relates to institutional research. More general discussions focusing on the applica-
bility of ABM for social science research can be found in Barr et al. [2008], Epstein
[2006], and Tesfatsion [2006]. Annotated pointers to ABM research on institutional
design and other application areas can be found at Axelrod and Tesfatsion [2010]
and Tesfatsion [2010a]. For concrete illustration, Section 3 presents sample find-
ings from ongoing ABM research focusing on the restructuring of electric power
markets. Concluding remarks are given in Section 4.
2 Agent-Based Modeling and Institutional Research
Agent-Based Modeling (ABM) begins with assumptions about “agents” and their
interactions and then uses computer simulation to generate histories that reveal the
dynamic consequences of these assumptions. The agents in ABMs can range from
passive physical world features with no cognitive function to individual and group
decision makers with sophisticated learning and communication capabilities.
More precisely, each agent in an ABM is a software program encompassing data
as well as methods that act on this data. Agents can have widely varying data and
methods, thus permitting cross-sectional heterogeneity. In addition, agents can con-
tain other agents as member data, thus permitting hierarchical constructions. The
data and methods of any particular agent are encapsulated, in the sense that they
can be partially or completely hidden from other agents. This encapsulation renders
agents imperfectly predictable from the viewpoint of other agents in their computa-
tional world.
In the real world all calculations must be done by entities actually residing in
the world. Agent encapsulation forces ABM researchers to respect this constraint.
Procedures encapsulated in the methods of a particular agent can only be imple-
mented using the particular resources available to that agent. Moreover, all proce-
dures must be implemented through the methods of agents within the world. Thus,
relative to traditional equation-based modeling, this encapsulation permits a more
3transparent and realistic representation of real-world systems composed of interact-
ing distributed entities with limited information and computational capabilities.
Cognitive agents in ABMs can exhibit behavioral adaptation, goal-directed learn-
ing, social communication (talking with each other!), and the endogenous formation
of interaction networks. A key aspect of these cognitive agents is their relative au-
tonomy relative to traditionally modeled economic agents. Cognitive ABM agents
can self-activate and self-determine their actions on the basis of internal data and
methods hidden from other agents. Moreover, these internal data and methods can
change over time as the cognitive agents explore and interact within their world.
Indeed, cognitive agents in ABMs should be able to pass the following construc-
tive replacement test: Given any cognitive agent interacting within an ABM through
its public interface (i.e., through its publicly accessible data and methods), it should
be feasible to replace this agent with a person that interacts within the ABM through
this same public interface. This leads naturally to the idea of a constructive Turing
test for judging the empirical fidelity of cognitive agent representations: Would a
person interacting within a mixed human-computational agent model be able to dis-
cern which other agents are human and which are computational? [Barr et al., 2008].
ABM researchers use controlled experimentation to investigate how large-scale
effects arise from the micro-level interactions of dispersed cognitive agents oper-
ating within variously specified physical and institutional environments. The insti-
tutions of interest have ranged from macroeconomic policy rules to the microeco-
nomic procurement processes of individual firms. In ABM research focusing specif-
ically on institutional design and performance, two basic normative questions are
typically addressed. First, does the institution promote efficient, fair, and orderly
social outcomes over time, despite possible attempts by cognitive agents to game
the institution for personal advantage? Second, under what conditions might the
institution give rise to unintended consequences?
ABM experiments resemble wetware culture-dish experiments. Each ABM ex-
periment starts from modeler-specified initial conditions and then proceeds forward
in time without further modeler interventions.
For example, the first step in an ABM institutional study is to develop an exper-
imental design for studying a particular institutional issue of interest. The second
step is to construct a computational world (“culture dish”) that incorporates salient
features of the institution for the purpose at hand. This computational world should
include cognitive agents that represent actual or projected real-world participants
in these institutions. Ideally, these cognitive agents should face the same types of
physical and financial constraints as their real-world counterparts.
The third step in an ABM institutional study is to specify a set of initial con-
ditions for the computational world in accordance with the experimental design.
Starting from these initial conditions, the fourth step is to permit the computational
world to evolve over time driven solely by agent interactions, with no intervention
from the modeler. The fifth step is to record outcomes of interest. The modeler then
repeatedly iterates through these third, fourth, and fifth steps until all initial condi-
tions specified under the experimental design have been tested.
43 Illustrative Application: Electricity Market Design
In 2003 the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) recommended
the adoption of a common market design for U.S. wholesale power markets [FERC,
2003]. As indicated in Figure 1, and elaborated in Joskow [2006], versions of this
design have been implemented (or adopted for implementation) in North American
energy regions in the Midwest, New England, New York, the Mid-Atlantic States,
California, the Southwest, and Texas.
Fig. 1 North American energy regions that have adopted FERC’s wholesale power market design.
Source: www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto/rto-map.asp
A core feature of FERC’s design is a reliance on locational marginal pricing
(LMP) to manage transmission grid congestion. Under this pricing system, the price
charged to wholesale buyers and received by wholesale sellers at a particular trans-
mission grid bus location at a particular point in time is the least cost to the system
of providing an additional increment of power at that bus location at that time.
For the past several years a group of researchers at Iowa State University has been
developing and using an agent-based test bed AMES (Agent-based Modeling of
Electricity Systems) to explore the performance characteristics of wholesale power
markets operating under FERC’s design [Tesfatsion, 2010b]. As indicated in Fig-
ure 2, AMES models strategic trading among a dispersed collection of Load-Serving
Entities (LSES) who bid to buy power at wholesale and Generation Companies
(GenCos) who offer to sell power at wholesale. These trading activities take place
within a two-settlement (real-time and day-ahead) energy market system adminis-
tered by a not-for-profit Independent System Operator (ISO), with congestion man-
aged by LMP. The power flows resulting from these trading activites are constrained
by the physical characteristics of an underlying AC transmission grid.
AMES experiments have been conducted using multi-period versions of a com-
monly used 5-bus training case and a standard 30-bus IEEE test case [Tesfatsion,
5Fig. 2 Core features of FERC’s wholesale power market design that have been incorporated into
the AMES Wholesale Power Market Test Bed.
2010b]. Key experimental treatment factors have included GenCo learning capabil-
ities, the form of GenCo supply offers, the price-sensitivity of LSE demand bids,
and price caps imposed by the ISO for the mitigation of market power.
Fig. 3 Average LMP outcomes on day 1000 for a 5-bus test case with and without GenCo learning
as the price-sensitivity of demand varies from 0% (R=0.0) to 100% (R=1.0).
One experimental finding has been the relative ease with which the GenCos can
learn to exercise market power through economic and physical capacity withhold-
ing, even when LSE demand bids are 100% price sensitive. As seen in Figure 3, this
capacity withholding results in a rise in LMP levels that is particulary dramatic for
treatments in which the price-sensitivity of demand is low.
Another experimental finding involves “ISO net surplus” collections in day-
ahead energy markets. ISO net surplus is determined each hour as the difference
between the LMP payments received by the ISO from energy buyers (the LSEs)
and the LMP payments distributed by the ISO to energy sellers (the GenCos). Con-
gestion arising on a transmission grid in any hour necessarily results in separation
6between the LMPs at two or more transmission grid bus locations, which in turn
necessarily results in a non-negative ISO net surplus for that hour.
As indicated by the experimental findings reported in Figures 3 through 5, ISO
net surplus and GenCo net earnings are simultaneously enhanced in market cir-
cumstances unfavorable to market efficiency [Li and Tesfatsion, 2010]. Specifically,
learning and price-sensitivity treatments resulting in greater GenCo capacity with-
holding, hence higher and more volatile LMPs, also result in greater ISO net surplus
collections and GenCo net earnings. Moreover, these ISO net surplus collections and
GenCo net earnings can be substantial in magnitude.
Fig. 4 LSE payments, GenCo revenues, ISO net surplus, and GenCo net earnings on day 1000
for the 5-bus test case without GenCo learning as the price-sensitivity of demand varies from 0%
(R=0.0) to 100% (R=1.0).
Fig. 5 Average LSE payments, GenCo revenues, ISO net surplus, and GenCo net earnings on day
1000 for the 5-bus test case with GenCo learning as the price-sensitivity of demand varies from 0%
(R=0.0) to 100% (R=1.0).
Empirical investigation confirms that ISO net surplus collections in actual North
American energy regions operating under LMP can indeed be substantial [Li and
Tesfatsion, 2010]. For example, in 2008, ISO net surplus collections ranged from
US$121 million in New England (ISO-NE) to US$2.66 billion in the Mid-Atlantic
States (PJM).
74 Concluding Remarks
Although this short essay has stressed ABM institutional research, it has highlighted
several distinctive capabilities of ABM. First, ABM focuses on the playing out of
processes over historical time rather than on the existence of equilibria. Second, the
flexible nature of ABM permits researchers to incorporate complicated physical,
institutional, and behavioral aspects of real-world situations. Third, ABM permits
researchers to study the effects of changes in these aspects on outcome distributions,
both spatially and temporally.
Given these distinctive capabilities, ABM is a welcome addition to the social
science toolkit. However, the full potential of ABM will only be realized when sup-
ported by appropriate data collection permitting empirically-grounded modeling at
the level of agent interactions.
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